Since gaining independence in 1991,
post-Soviet Azerbaijan has been experiencing a broad-based Islamic revival
shaped by both homegrown as well as foreign influences. The clash of these
influences has generated an “Islamization” contest for the souls of the
country’s population, the majority of whom are Shiite as well as ethnic Turks.
This competition has unfolded between Shiite and Sunni preachers as well as
between different Sunni movements, including traditional Azeri Shafei
movements, Salafi Khanbali (Hambali) streams that have been “imported” from the
Arab world, and Turkish Hanafi activists and organizations.
Of all the Sunni movements in Azerbaijan,
the most influential is the Turkish Nurcular network that is now led by its dominant
offshoot known widely as the “Gülen” or “Hizmet” movement. Named for its
founder, the Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen, the movement is a
faith-based educational network that is enormously well-resourced and highly
active internationally, especially in the Turkic world that stretches from
Turkey into Central Asia.
In Azerbaijan, the Gülen movement has
succeeded in reaching out to a diverse population, but especially to urban elites.
It is different from other Islamic movements in that it promotes its religious
teachings not through outright proselytization, but discreetly through its
network of secular educational institutions, social media and business
associations. Moreover, the movement has not become directly involved in the
hotly contested disputes over the place of religion in post-Soviet Azerbaijan
that have been generated by the country’s religious revival. Whereas Azeri
secularists, Islamic activists and liberal human rights defenders have all
traded barbs over Islam and “Muslim rights” including whether hijab can be worn in public spaces, the Gülen movement has largely remained
silent on these matters.
Because of the Hizmet movement’s political
quietism and its appearance of secularism, Sunni Islamists have repeatedly criticized it as “un-Islamic,” for
introducing “innovations” (bida) into Islam, and for ignoring the problems
that religious Muslims face. Alternatively, both Azeri secularists and Shia
religious activists have accused the Gülen network of promoting a hidden
Turkish-Sunni Islamist political agenda, of serving as political agents for
Turkey, and of promoting Sunnism against Azerbaijan’s native Shiism. Such
widely divergent appraisals have given rise to many questions and considerable
suspicion about the Gülen movement and its aims. What makes the movement so
different from the other Islamic movements operating in Azerbaijan? What is the
Gülen movement’s agenda in Azerbaijan, and what is its relationship to affiliated
Nurcular associations back home in Turkey and elsewhere internationally? Will
the movement and its growing network continue to integrate with secular Azeri
society, or is it following a hidden agenda with the aim of refashioning
Azerbaijani society?
The Movement
Today
The Gülen or Hizmet movement is a
transnational network of institutions and individuals who follow the teachings
of the Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen. Gülen himself is a follower of
Said Nursi (1878-1960), a towering figure in modern Turkish Islam who
established the Nurcular revivalist movement in post-Ottoman Turkey of the 1920s. Although Nursi
never directly involved himself in political life, he was a hugely influential
religious thinker. A fierce opponent of the secularist ideology of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, Nursi was officially deemed an enemy of the state in 1935 and
spent the next eleven years in prison.[1]
Evidently, the Kemalist authorities felt threatened by Nursi’s teachings and by
the semi-secret, underground network of obedient followers that the preacher
came to lead. Known as the Nur Talebeleri, or “followers of light,” Nursi’s
followers formed themselves into a hierarchical organization that resembled the
structure of a traditional Sufi order and soon became popularly known as the
“Nurcu Movement.”
Nursi’s teachings are collected in his
book, the Risaleyi-Nur. After his death, Nursi’s closest disciples in Turkish cities began to
convene courses to study his philosophy. Soon, the movement became split
between several of Nursi’s disciples, including teachers like Hüsrev
Altınbaşak, Mehmet Kayalar, Hulusi Yahyagil, Zübeyr Gündüzalp, Mustafa Sungur
and Mehmet Kurdoglu. These divisions have persisted with time. In 1950, the
Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a resolution to rehabilitate the
literary heritage of Said Nursi, and this thereby effectively legalized the
publication and translation of his works and the movement they inspired.
However, official suspicions of the movement remained.
In the 1970s, Gülen Haci Effendi, a
charismatic imam from the city of Izmir, began preaching Nursi’s ideas and
calling for a revival of Islam in Turkey. Initially, the young imam had
supported Zübeyr Gündüzalp’s Yeni Asiya movement, but Gülen ultimately broke
with that movement, claiming it had become too involved in politics.[2]
Gülen’s missionary outreach soon attracted a loyal following that began to
constitute itself into a close-knit, vertically-structured organization devoted
to the study of Nursi’s ideas as well as Gülen’s written works. Since the early
1970s, this movement has formed a unique network within the broader Nurcular
movement that is distinguished from other followers of Nursi’s teachings, the
majority of whom are now led by another Nurcular teacher, Mustafa Sungur.
According to various experts, what makes the Gülen movement different from
other Nurcular movements is its clear hierarchical structure, its strict
internal discipline, the secrecy of its laws, its openness to capitalism and
avowedly pro-business stance, and its focus on working through media
associations and businesses to develop the movement.[3]
The rapid emergence of this network in
secularist Turkey in the 1970s aroused a great deal of suspicion. Turkish
authorities began to scrutinize Gülen’s activities, and he subsequently moved
to the U.S. where he now lives. His movement, however, remains enormously
influential in his native Turkey and abroad. Through its business connections,
the movement has accumulated enormous financial resources that it uses to
support its social activities and public outreach in Turkey and elsewhere
around the world.[4] One analysis
that drew from Turkish media resources showed that the Hizmet movement
experienced a sharp increase in its total operating capital beginning in the
mid-1980s: today, the movement’s total worth is estimated to be more than $50
billion and to comprise about 30 percent of the Turkish economy.[5]
Worldwide, the Gülen network includes
branches in 115 countries and features over 500 businesses, 6 universities,
over 700 schools, 14 journals, the widely read newspaper Zaman ("Time"), the global Samanyolu TV channel (STV), and two radio
channels.[6] According to a survey by the Turkish company Konsensus, Fethullah Gülen’s movement is now the second largest religious community
in Turkey after the Alevis.[7]
Moreover, according to the High Command of the Armed Forces of Turkey, the
number of Gülen’s followers reaches as high as 4 million people in Turkey.[8]
In Turkey, the Gülen movement, as with some
other Nurcu movements, is a well-structured, hierarchical organization. Thus, a
typical Turkish city-level cell usually consists of the following levels: shagirdlar (students), uy imams (groups of five students and their leaders), semt imams (an association of fives on the basis of the urban district or educational
institution and their leaders), and bolge imams (head of district level.)[9]
Students are recruited and controlled at a local level by Nurcu abis (brothers) and by ablas (sisters). According to former members of
this network, the movement possesses its own security service that is tasked
with rooting out moles and agents of national intelligence and law enforcement
services.[10] The movement keeps a database of all its members, and
the training of each new recruit emphasizes the need to exercise discretion in
revealing their involvement with the Gülen network. Students are additionally
instructed to respect and obey the network’s leadership.[11]
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
movement began to focus its international religious outreach and networking
efforts in the newly formed republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) and among the Muslim populations located in the Russian Federation.[12]
Like many other Islamic revivalist movements, the Hizmet movement met with
formidable resistance in the secularist environments of post-Soviet countries.
In part because of this, the movement has tended to conduct its international
outreach in a secretive fashion, much as it did when it first emerged in
Kemalist Turkey. Today, some researchers claim that because of governmental
scrutiny in Russia and the CIS, the Gülen movement has formed a transnational
network of semi-underground cells that are far larger than most estimates.[13]
The secrecy surrounding the movement has
aroused considerable suspicion about its activities and ultimate goals.
According to Mikhail Davidov, the movement’s underground network operates as a
sort of intelligence service that collects information on political, economic,
confessional and other dynamics in the Turkic-speaking regions and countries
where the movement is seeking to spread its influence.[14]
Moreover, it has been claimed that the Gülen network works surreptitiously to
infiltrate communities and the governments of Turkey and the CIS and promote
its adherents to positions of power and influence.[15]
Because of these and connected fears, the movement has been banned in Russia
and Uzbekistan by notoriously anti-Islamic authorities who see it as a
subversive threat. Other Central Asian regimes have also been extremely wary of
the Hizmet presence.[16]
Azerbaijan, by contrast, has always been more open to the movement, and it is
in this post-Soviet country where the network has arguably had its greatest
success and impact to date.
The Network in
Azerbaijan
The Gülen movement established itself in
Azerbaijan shortly after the country obtained independence from the Soviet
Union. In 1992, Azerbaijan became the first country outside of Turkey where the
movement opened its schools.[17]
The network’s first steps into Azerbaijan began with the official visit of the Zaman newspaper general manager Mr. İlhan İşbilen, who sought to initiate
contact with Baku to launch the movement’s activities. Soon thereafter, Zaman began circulating in Azerbaijan, and the movement’s first school, STV and
a number of other companies opened. In the meantime, the movement’s Güney-Doğu
regional representative, Mr. Ali Bayram, visited the head of the Nakhchivan
Autonomous Republic Mr. Heydar Aliyev, who later became the President of
Azerbaijan. Mr. Bayram distinguished himself by supporting the Nakhchivan
region, which was then suffering from the Armenian blockade, and was able to
gain the sympathy of President H. Aliyev.
After winning Aliyev’s support, the Gülen
movement enjoyed real opportunities to expand its activities, and by 1993, the
movement had actively begun building a network of educational institutions and
businesses. For instance, according to the Islamic scholar Arif Yunus, once the
movement “secured itself in the country,” it began “establishing a network of
commercial entities that directed their revenues to the further propaganda of
Nurcu ideas. These include the furniture, clock and confectionery
manufacturers: Istigbal, Romanson and Ulker.”[18]
Today, the movement’s business network includes the educational company CAĞ
ÖYRETİM A.Ş., “NIL” stationary and book shops, the business association TÜSİAB,
the Zaman printing house, Burc FM radio station, STV, and the Xazar TV, Support to Youth
Foundation.
It should be noted that the movement’s
media outlets are not explicitly religious. In fact, it is difficult to tell
the difference between them and other secular media with an unaided eye.
However, the Support to Youth Foundation is relatively more “religious” because
besides its charity work and the courses it offers in English, computers and
other subjects for children, it holds Arabic and Qur’an recitation courses, has
a library full of Islamic religious books, including ones by Said Nursi and Fethullah
Gülen, and a prayer room.
The movement’s rapid expansion in
Azerbaijan and the official support it has enjoyed there has made the secular
authorities in nearby Turkey nervous. In 1998-1999, high-ranking Turkish
officials openly voiced their displeasure about the movement during a meeting
with President Aliyev accusing it of having an Islamist agenda. Aliyev
responded forcefully, however, denying the existence of a threat.[19]
There are now fourteen Gülen education institutions, consisting of Qafqaz
University, a private school and twelve lyceums in Baku, Sumgayit, Aghdash,
Mingachevir, Guba, Lankaran, Sheki, Nakhchevan, Ordubad and Sharur.[20]
It is worth noting that the head of the movement in any given country is also
the head of the movement’s educational institutions; in Azerbaijan, the head is
Dr. Enver Özeren, Chairman of the Board of CAĞ ÖYRETİM.
The network in any given country is usually
divided into three tiers or groups. The first group includes people who are
closest to Gülen and the immediate circle of his most trusted and loyal
followers. The second group includes those who work directly for the movement
to achieve its larger objectives. The third group includes mainly sympathizers
of the movement and they largely consist of journalists, business people,
public officials, alumni of Hizmet schools, and friends. While this third
grouping is not always formally a part of the network, the network does often
mobilize it to pursue various ends.
In Azerbaijan, the central and coordinating
point of the Gülen network is CAĞ ÖYRETİM (see diagram below). The business
association TÜSİAB Azərbaycan Türk
Sənayeci və İşadamları Beynəlxalq Cəmiyyəti (Azerbaijan Turkish Industrialists and Business People International
Society) is also a focal point for the businesses affiliated with the movement.
However, TÜSİAB is first and foremost an association of Turkish businessmen in
the Azerbaijan, and it should be noted that not all TÜSİAB members are a part
of the Gülen movement.
In 2002, the Türk İş Adamları Dərnəyi
(Turkish Business People Club) was established as an alternative non-Gülen
business association. In 2004, it was renamed the ATIB (Azərbaycan Türkiyə İş
Adamları Birliyi—Azerbaijan Turkey Business People Union) and started operating
actively. The main reason for ATIB’s creation was that some of the large
Turkish businesses not associated with the movement did not feel comfortable
associating with the organization. A likely reason for the creation of ATIB was
the scandal among non-Gülen Turkish business people in Azerbaijan caused by
Prime-Minister Erdogan’s visit to Azerbaijan in 2003. The trip was reportedly
arranged by Gülen associates without any prior consultation of others and,
according to one media report, the movement’s involvement deeply upset other
unaffiliated Turkish businessmen.[21]
All of the network’s Azerbaijan-based
institutions and businesses work in a cooperative, mutually supportive fashion.
For example, “elder” brothers and sisters encourage all members of the network,
especially those who reside in “movement-run student dormitories” (ishik evleri), to buy from shops and eat in restaurants that belong to the network.
Moreover, they are all also encouraged to watch only STV or Xazar TV, Xazar radio or Burc FM radio, and to read Zaman publications.[22]
One of the clearest indicators of the
movement’s overall success is its ownership of television and radio channels.
This is an enormous achievement in contemporary Azerbaijan. Since no group
aside of the ruling elite has ever acquired as much independent influence in
the Azeri media as the Gülen movement through media channels. The fact that the
movement has both foreign and religious roots makes its media operations in
Azerbaijan’s secularist and highly centralized environment all the more
remarkable.
Since the arrival of the group in
Azerbaijan, it has made a targeted effort to recruit the children of the
country’s elite into their education institutions. It has also sought to
involve young individuals who are likely to become the country’s future
technocratic, business and political elite; they reportedly have enjoyed many
successes in doing this. The Gülen movement’s combined message of moderate
Islam and pan-Turkic nationalism appeals to many Azeris, especially the younger
generation, who see it as an alternative to the secular Baku regime as well as
“medieval” Salafi-Wahhabi Islam and Iranian-style Shiite Islamism. [23]
According to a number of sources
interviewed for this paper, there are already several members of the
Azerbaijani parliament from different parties as well as high-ranking officials
in the President’s Office and other governmental bodies who are either affiliated
or supportive of the movement. In addition to other public officials, the
movement has, despite some setbacks, been successful in building a network of
former alumni of its schools and friendly businessmen.[24]
Moreover, unlike in other CIS contries, Gülen schools have the support of the
state in Azerbaijan and there are no official barriers to their activities.
Some argue that the official acceptance of Gülen can be attributed to the
movement’s overall integration into Azerbaijan’s secular order and its economic
life, not to mention its clear contributions to Azeri society at large.
Still, official acceptance has not allayed
Azerbaijani suspicions and concerns that the Gülen movement is harboring a
hidden political agenda. In fact, the rise to power of an Islamist-oriented
government in Turkey has stoked these popular fears in Azerbaijan. Many worry
that the AKP’s success in Turkey, which has clearly been buttressed by the
Turkish Nurcular and Gülen movements, could also inspire the movement’s
Azerbaijan-based adherents. Between 2009 and 2010, several waves of anti-Nurcu
media coverage and reports were broadcast in the Azerbaijani media and these
were accompanied by several high-profile arrests of Turkish nationals on
charges of spreading religious propaganda and extremism. Azerbaijan’s
Shaykh-ul-Islam Haji Allahshukur Pashazade is also known for his critical
statements about Nurcu ideology and its activities in Azerbaijan.[25]
The secularist Azerbaijani media has
fiercely criticized the Nurcu network for brainwashing youth.[26]
From time to time, the media will feature the “confessions” of former Gülen
members that expose what life is like within the movement. The programs show
how young people are recruited, manipulated and then subjected to the strict
control of abis or ablas. According to various reports, the movement has tried to bring youngsters
studying in their schools into the ishik evi or yurd houses, which are large communal apartments capable of accommodating more
than fifteen students and 3 to 4 abis or ablas.[27] In these houses, the elder brothers and sisters teach lessons on the
fundamentals of Islam and the works of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen.
Distinguished students get promoted to the level of agabeys, or elder brothers, and they are then expected to recruit other young
people.[28] In exchange for their obedience and commitment to the
movement, media reports indicate that the students have all their financial and
career problems solved. The network pays for their education, provides them
with housing, and helps to find them a job in Gülen-affiliated companies or in
un-affiliated companies where network members are present.
It must be noted that the Nurcu activists
who have been arrested in Azerbaijan are typically Turkish or Azeri youth who
spread Said Nursi’s works; no direct affiliates of Gülen have ever been
prosecuted. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani media’s coverage of alleged
Turkish-Islamist conspiracies are associated largely with the Nurcu movement in
general; they are rarely linked to Gülen’s network in particular. Indeed, there
are other non-Gülen Nurcu activists who are not as well integrated into secular
Azeri society and who are actively involved in religious missionary work,
especially in the rural areas of Azerbaijan. For example, the Nurcu leader
Mustafa Sungur also has a lot of supporters who receive lessons on Said Nursi's
works in informal settings at private residences. Some distinguished students
and followers of this particular network are sent to Turkey to continue their
religious studies.[29]
Integration or
Ulterior Motives?
Azerbaijan, like other former Soviet
republics, has yet to overcome the Soviet legacy of
“militant” secularism and secularism that shapes its official culture and also
drives popular, anti-Islamic sentiments. The Islamic revival has thus generated
an array of controversies over issues surrounding religion and public life.
Given the opposing dogmatic views of religious and anti-religious radicals,
Islam has emerged as a central theme of the public discourse over what kind of
society Azerbaijan is to become.
Unlike many Islamic revival movements that
have clashed with secular Azeri society, the Gülen movement has always
portrayed itself principally as a social movement that seeks to integrate with
the secular order, not overturn it. Indeed, the movement eschews political
confrontation and it rejects pietistic withdrawal from society. Despite this,
many Azerbaijanis remain deeply suspicious of the movement. They believe that
its claims to seek integration are deceptive, and that the movement’s strategy
is to use its financial, political and social capital to acquire more power and
influence and then to “Islamize” legislation and civil society.[30]
At that point, Gülen leaders could plausibly undertake to change the structure
of the regime itself.
In many respects, the secretive nature of
the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan, its missionary-style tactics and use of
secular schools to promote their teachings, as well as the movement’s
disassociation from outright religious and political activism, resembles how it
operated when it first emerged in Kemalist Turkey, at a time when it faced
constant scrutiny from the government and public at-large. Now that Turkey is
governed by an Islamist-oriented party, the Gülen movement has become
increasingly politically active in Turkey. Likewise, a number of Azeri experts
interviewed for this paper claim that the movement seeks “participation [in
society] in the hope of controlling the state or shaping policies.” Moreover,
they claim the movement seeks to temporarily “accommodate” the current order
rather than to “integrate” with society over the long-term.
Despite such concerns, hard evidence of a
hidden political agenda is lacking. Indeed, the movement’s leaders are already
drawn from the country’s political elite and they openly support and cooperate
with the Aliyev government. The government has little reason now to doubt the
movement’s secular-orientation or its political loyalties. Moreover, in light
of ongoing controversies generated by the Islamic revival as well as fears over
growing Iranian influence and Wahhabi-inspired terrorism, the Gülen movement
has successfully presented itself to secularist Azerbaijani officials as the
most moderate and most politically acceptable strain of Islam. Indeed, when it
first arrived in Azerbaijan, the movement’s faith-based identity was evident.
Today, however, the movement’s members hardly display their religious agenda in
public at all. There is, for example, no Religious Studies Department at Qafqaz
University anymore; there isn’t even a prayer room. In other Gülen-affiliated
institutions, there are no official religious ceremonies or events.
For a number of reasons, it is highly
unlikely that Azerbaijani authorities will crack down on the Gülen movement.
First, because of the movement’s rising influence in AKP-dominated Turkey, a
crackdown on the movement in Azerbaijan would likely adversely affect the
relationships between the two countries. Second, the movement is becoming more
influential even outside of Turkey, influencing the Turkish diaspora in Europe,
the U.S. and in other countries. Third, because Azerbaijan is predominantly
Shiite, the movement is seen as a natural check on the spread of Shiite
Islamism and of Iranian influence. Thus, Bayram Balci and Altay Goyushov have
observed that the government consciously “gives its preference to Turkish
Islamic influence than to local and Iranian dynamics of revival.”[31]
It is also seen as a bulwark against radical Sunni influences such as
Wahhabism. The fourth reason is that the movement runs a successful network of
educational institutions attended by the offspring of Azerbaijan’s elite,
including influential government officials and oligarchs. Finally, there are
substantial business ties between Azerbaijani officials, oligarchs and
Gülen-linked enterprises.[32]
Despite Azerbaijani officialdom’s
reluctance to criticize the movement, a number of independent opposition
groups, both secular and religious, have become openly critical of it. Some
liberals, for example, have complained about the movement’s closeness to the
Azerbaijani regime, as well as its anti-democratic tendencies.[33]
As the social scientist Eldar Mamedov argues: “Many Azerbaijani liberals also
fret about what they see as the Gülen movement’s hypocrisy and opportunism:
amid an Azerbaijani government clampdown on the freedom of expression and
assembly in 2011, the Gülen movement´s flagship newspaper, Zaman, ran a number of stories praising Azerbaijan’s ‘visionary leadership.’
This struck civil society activists as incongruous given the movement’s claims
to support democracy in Turkey and elsewhere.”[34]
The relationship between the Gülen movement
and Azerbaijan’s other major religious groups is also frequently tense. Shia
activists complain that the movement is too passive and secular. The movement
remained silent, for example, when the Shia led protests against the hijab ban in schools, and also when the government recently closed several
mosques and tried to ban the athan, or traditionalcall to prayer, during the
day. Thus, many Shia leaders see the movement as hypocritical and
insufficiently pious; they accuse the movement of practicing taqiyya, or dissembling, for the sole purpose of acquiring power in Azerbaijan. It
is frequently alleged that the primary motive for this is to advance both
movement’s sectarian interests as well as the national interests of Turkey
among Azerbaijan’s Shia majority and in nearby Iran.
Sunni Islamists in Azerbaijan have been
especially critical of the Gülen movement. In Salafi-Wahhabi Internet forums,
the Nurcu movement and Gülenists in particular are typically attacked as being
“people of innovation” and “wrong” Muslims.[35]
By the Wahhabi standards of “pure Islam,” the movement’s Sufi orientation, its
increasingly “post-Islamist” appearance and integration into the secularized
Azeri society are seen as especially egregious transgressions of Islam. Despite
this, the Gülen movement has sometimes been praised by Salafi-Wahhabi actors
for spreading Sunni Islam through secular institutions, and thus for
challenging the dominance of Shiite notions and traditions. Both Salafism and
the Gülen movement are united in being relatively new to Azerbaijan, and
surrounded with various stereotypes and myths.[36]
However, both trends have become integral parts of Sunni Islam in Azerbaijan
displacing traditional “domestic” Sunni Islam of Shafi’i madhab. Moreover, as
they both continue to challenge the dominance of Shiism, they are bound to
become natural competitors for influence among religious Sunnis of Azerbaijan.
Conclusion
The Gülen movement has arguably emerged as
the most successful movement in Azerbaijan’s unfolding Islamic revival. No
other Islamic movement in Azerbaijan can claim such an extensive organization
or level of influence in business, charity, lobbying and, above all, in the
field of education. Moreover, the movement has managed to acquire this
influence without revealing its ideological mission. This has, not
surprisingly, generated considerable suspicion of its motives. And despite its
reputation as a “post- Islamist” movement that seeks integration with society,
it is nonetheless still widely perceived as having a religious-political
agenda.
Notwithstanding the Gülen movement’s
success, its flexibility, and growing prominence in Azerbaijani society, its
future expansion in Azerbaijan will face some limits. In the view of the social
scientist Eldar Mamedov, “the pluralistic nature of Azerbaijani society, which
includes secular liberals, intelligentsia, Shiites, non-Turkic minorities, and,
above all, the strong tradition of indigenous secularism…” are both important
barriers to the movement’s expansion.[37]
Mamedov also argues that the movement´s emphasis on Turkism and Islam alienates
certain groups, including the politically influential Baku-based and
Russian-speaking secularized intelligentsia.[38]
Moreover, despite Azerbaijan’s Soviet past,
Islam, and specifically Shiite Islam, remains an important part of its national
and historical identity. This is especially true in the south of the country
and in the rural parts of Absheron Peninsula. For the Gülen movement, operating
in the more conservative Shia parts of the country ismore difficult than in
other places. The well-established and politically influential institution of
the Spiritual Board of the Caucasus Muslims and Sheikh-ul-Islam is another
obstacle that inhibits the operations of all Sunni Islamic movement in the
country, including Gülen. In order to gain mass support, the movement will need
to facilitate the popular conversion of Shia Muslims to Sunnism and then to
Nurcuism. The chances of this occurring are slim.
The Gülen movement’s approach of targeting
the urban elite also undermines their influence among the rural, poor
population, thus reducing the number of its potential supporters and members in
Sunni-dominated regions of Azerbaijan.
Therefore, the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan
is operating under constant pressure. Various actors with different
agendas—some political, others sectarian—are scrutinizing the movement’s
activities, and many are keen to roll back its influence. Azerbaijani society
as a whole remains deeply wary of Islamism. And because of the Gülen movement’s
secrecy, it is, and will remain, an object of suspicion. In the public’s view,
the question of whether the movement seeks integration with Azeri society or to
transform from within according to a Turkish-Islamist agenda remains largely
unanswered. Given the movement’s historical flexibility and its extensive
organizational structure in Azerbaijan, it could at least in principle and for
the time being seek both ends.
Fuad Aliyev is a Fulbright Scholar at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Deputy Chairman of
the Azerbaijan Marketing Society.
[1]
Bayram Balci, “Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their
Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam” Religion, State & Society, Vol. 31: (2003), No. 2,
[2]
Fulya Atacan, “A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001)
[5]
Davidov, M.N. “The Activities of Turkish Religious Sect Nucular” Деятельность турецкой религиозной секты
«Нурджулар».” (Russian, blog.), November 3, 2007. The
Institute of the Near East http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/03-11-07b.html
[9]
Davidov, M.N. “The Activities of Turkish Religious Sect Nucular” Деятельность турецкой религиозной секты
«Нурджулар».” (Russian, blog.), November 3, 2007. The
Institute of the Near East http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/03-11-07b.html
[12]
Arif Yunus Islamic Palette
in Azerbaijan, Adiloglu, Baku 2012
[14]
Davidov, M.N. “The Activities of Turkish Religious Sect Nucular” 2007
[15]
Ibid or Ahmet Sik, “The Army of the Imam.”
[17]
Goksel, Nigar “Religiously-Inspired Bonding: Changing Soft Power Elements in
Turkey’s Relations with Azerbaijan,” Vol. 4 N. 8, 2011
[18] Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and
Islamic Meaning in Turkey” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. ed. by Quintain Wiktorowicz ( Bloomington ID: Indiana University Press,
2004), p. 40
[19]
Arif Yunus, Islamic Palette
in Azerbaijan, Adiloglu, Baku 2012
[21]
Khadija Ismaylova. ‘Nurchular’ era
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