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Somalilandsun
- At the star of the month the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was the target
of a suicide car-bombing. A Turkish policeman lost his life in the attack and
three others were wounded. The extremist movement al-Shabaab (The Youth), an
off-shoot of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack.
The
attack raised a number of questions about why the Turks had been targeted.
For several years now, Ankara has played a very important role in attempts to
alleviate the human tragedy in Somalia caused by the civil war and drought.
So what could have enraged the assailants? What is the message they were
trying to send to Turkish decision-makers?
1.
Attacks in Somalia and the Turks.
An
examination of the security record in Somalia over the past year and a half
reveals that this is not the first attack targeting Turks. The recent report
of the UN Secretary-General's office, S/2013/326 issued on 13 May 2013 shows
that one of the Turkish aid convoys was attacked by a vehicle driven by a
suicide bomber. In October of last year, Mustafa Haşimi, head of Africa
operations in TIKA (the Turkish International Aid Agency), was attacked by
armed militias in central Somalia near the town of Galkayo and slightly
wounded. According to Somali media, there had been fierce clashes between the
militia and units attached to the Puntland police escorting the TIKA
official. During the clashes one of the militants was killed and three others
were wounded. Earlier still, in March 2012, Muhtar Abu Zubayir, the leader of
the al-Shabaab movement attacked the Turkish state in a recorded message he
sent out via a radio station, accusing Ankara of being the gateway through
which Western colonialism enters Somalia. Sheikh Mahmud Ragi (Ali Tayri), the
official spokesman for al-Shabaab threatened to carry out more attacks on
Turkish diplomats.
These
incidents are evidence that Turkey's Somalia policy has now entered a new
stage, and that the turmoil inside the country and its repercussions abroad
will have adverse consequences on Turkey's work in the country. Ever since
the Somali state went bankrupt at the start of the 1990s it has experienced a
series of complex security challenges. Security, political, tribal, clan, and
religious issues are entangled with one another, and a steady rise in foreign
involvement has further complicated the picture.
Bearing
this complexity in mind enables us to better understand the remarks of
Mohammed Mirsel Sheikh, Somalia's ambassador to Turkey, to the Anatolia
Agency in Ankara earlier this month. The Somali ambassador alluded to the
confused state of affairs in his country when he remarked that "the
machinery of the state is weak in Somalia, including its security
apparatus." The ambassador continued, "the fact that al-Shahaab
al-Mujahidin has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Turkish embassy
in Mogadishu is not by itself sufficient. It is essential that we work
together with the Turkish government to identify those responsible for the
attack."
2.
The Turkish-Somali Military Agreement: A Turning Point?
The
attacks on Turks appear to have started early in 2012. The attacks have not
been continuous but appear to be occurring at intervals and, as such, are
reminiscent of the attacks on the African forces in Somalia. In addition to
the strategic aspect of Somalia's relations with Turkey, it's important to
remember that after the war with Kenya and before the recent attack on the
Turkish Embassy, al-Shahaab had itself been subject to attacks in the areas
of southern Somalia that it controlled. [1]During al-Shabaab's war with
Kenya, the Somali government had also been involved, despite an initial
delay. In order to strengthen the combat capabilities of the weak Somali
government forces, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a military training agreement
on 13 April of last year. It included training programs, exchanges, visits,
and discussions between the Turkish and Somali armies. There's little doubt
that the al-Shabaab movement blames its defeats (particularly the loss of
Kismayo Harbour in September 2012) on the foreign powers which had fought
directly against it and those who were indirectly involved by training Somali
government forces. Turkey falls into this latter category.
The
war waged against al-Shahaab by Kenya, Africa, and the Somali government
forces came onto the international agenda at the same time as the Arab
Spring. Libya's former leader, Muammar Gaddafi devoted a lot of effort in his
final years to playing a key role in Somalia and channelling weapons to the
various factions and groups there. Eritrea has also been accused of arming
various Somali groups, among them al-Shabaab, though it has persistently
denied these accusations. Nevertheless, Eritrea's president Isaias Afewerki lost
his biggest ally when Gaddafi was overthrown and now finds himself facing a
much bigger challenge.
The
clashes taking place in the Middle East have been strikingly reflected in the
Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. [2] Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and
Israel all regard this region as important to their national security. There
have been a lot of reports published recently which mention a gradual
increase in Iran's presence in the area, in parallel with the crisis in Yemen
and escalating Western opposition to Teheran. Indeed, Iran has been accused
many times of supplying weaponry to al-Shabaab by sea. Leaving aside the
veracity of the accusations, and regardless of whether the Somali government
currently appears more stable than it did in previous years, Somalia is a
prime candidate for an arena where increasing tensions from regional and
international conflicts will be expressed.
3.
Oil? Now What?
Somalia
has recently witnessed a number of important developments with economic and
strategic consequences. From the start of last year, there have been
increasing signs that international petroleum and natural gas companies have
renewed their interests in Somalia. Reports indicate that Somalia has rich
reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and uranium. If this is the case, Somalia
could become one of the world's largest energy producers. However these
developments have led American, Italian, and British companies to compete and
jockey for position, much like they did in the 1990s. There are those who
argue that this competition was responsible for the failure of
"Operation Hope", the joint U.S.-UN intervention in Somalia of the
early 1990s. There are accusations that Italy had supported Muhammed Farah
Aidid, the clan leader who was the main enemy of the American military. As
Somalia's former colonial master, Rome argues that Washington knew nothing
about the social fabric and tribal structure of Somalia, claiming that this
was the cause of the mission's failure. More recently, in October 2012, the
government of Somaliland (the territory which unilaterally proclaimed its
independence from Somalia in the early 1990s) signed an agreement with
General Energy. Turkey has since also joined the line of investors interested
in Somalia.
There
are other questions which could be asked about the details mentioned above.
Is the Turkish government aware of all these complications in Somalia? Does
it have the capability to deal with increasing attacks on Turkish targets and
interests in the country? In Turkish role, was it only targeted at the need
for humanitarian assistance- maybe it was done in way that it worked for a
political stability that helped the interests of oil companies and
traditional powers be in Somalia or Horn of Africa-? It appears that Turkish
decision-makers are feeling the need to review their regional policy, partly
with regard to checking the degree of acceptance for their roles in Somalia
and partly to further their understanding of tribal and political relations
in the country and their impact upon its domestic and foreign policies. The
military forces now being trained for the benefit of the Somali state could
quickly turn into an anti-government force if political and tribal interests
prevailed over loyalty to the state. They could even also turn against the
foreign country training them. What applies to the Somali government is
equally applicable to al-Shabaab: all these armed groups are either being
organized within the government or splitting off from it—depending on their
interests and their tribal links. This fact creates potential internal and
regional weaknesses which reflect the fluctuations already mentioned.
Therefore, Turkish decision-makers determining Somalia policy should take
these weaknesses into consideration.
http://www.turkishweekly.net
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